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Report and Communication
On Empirical Validation of
Compactness Measures for
Electoral Redistricting and
Its Significance for Application
of Models in the Social Sciences
Christine Chou1, Steven O. Kimbrough2, Frederic H. Murphy3,
John Sullivan-Fedock4, and C. Jason Woodard5
Abstract
Use of optimization models in science and policy applications is often problematic because the best
available models are very inaccurate representations of the originating problems. Such is the case
with electoral districting models, for which there exist no generally accepted measures of com-
pactness, in spite of many proposals and much analytical study. This article reports on an experi-
mental investigation of subjective judgments of compactness for electoral districts. The experiment
draws on a unique database of 116 distinct, legally valid districting plans for the Philadelphia City
Council, discovered with evolutionary computation. Subjects in the experiment displayed, in the
aggregate, remarkable agreement with several standard measures of compactness, thus providing
warrant for use of these measures that has heretofore been unavailable. The exercise also lends
support to the underlying methodology on display here, which proposes to use models based on
subjective judgments in combination with algorithms that find multiple solutions in order to support
application of optimization models in contexts in which they are only very approximate
representations.
Keywords
systems design, evolutionary design, emotive design, genetic algorithms, evolutionary computing,
districting, zone design, compactness, redistricting, reapportionment, interactive evolutionary
computing
1Department of International Business, National Dong Hwa University, Hualien, Taiwan
2University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
3 Temple University, Philadelphia, PA, USA
4Operations and Information Management, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
5 School of Information Systems, Singapore Management University, Singapore
Corresponding Author:
Steven O. Kimbrough, University of Pennsylvania, 3730 Walnut Street, Suite 500, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA.
Email: kimbrough@wharton.upenn.edu
Social Science Computer Review
2014, Vol. 32(4) 534-543
ª The Author(s) 2013
Reprints and permission:
sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0894439313484262
sscr.sagepub.com
 at Li Ka Shing Library on November 5, 2014ssc.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Introduction
Advances in articulating and solving constrained optimization models often lead to progress in
science and progress in solving real-world design problems. Better algorithms for finding optimal
solutions, however, can do little to address real-world problems if the models themselves are very
inaccurate representations of the originating problems. In the face of model inaccuracies, we have
basically three choices, each of which may be appropriate depending upon circumstances:
1. Do the best we can in building the model, obtain an optimal solution for it, act on an optimal
solution, and hope for the best.
2. Insist on an accurate model and then wait to decide until one is available and has a solution.
3. Use the admittedly flawed model to support discussion and deliberation, implementing a
modification of an optimal solution to the model in response to considerations not fully
represented in the model.
Recent work, undertaken in the context of the design of electoral districts, has led to a promising
technique in conjunction with the third option, aimed at making the option more attractive in cases
where the proposal can be applied (Chou, Kimbrough, Sullivan, Woodard, & Murphy, 2012; Gopa-
lan, Kimbrough, Murphy, & Quintus, 2013, 2012a). The proposal is designed for cases in which it is
problematic to define and parameterize an objective function mathematically; yet, human subjective
judgments can distinguish better and worse solutions. Such cases are, perhaps surprisingly, common,
as the extensive literature in so-called interactive evolutionary computation (IEC) attests. (The IEC
idea originated in The Blind Watchmaker; Dawkins, 1985. See Chou et al., 2012 and Takagi, 2001
for overview and references on subsequent developments.) Not surprisingly, the downside of relying
on human subjective judgments for selecting the good solutions from a large pool of solutions is
human fatigue and consequent failures of discrimination. Takagi and Iba (2005) call this ‘‘the most
pressing problem in IEC systems.’’
As a partial remedy to this problem, Chou, Kimbrough, Sullivan, Woodard, and Murphy (2012)
propose what they call validated surrogate fitness (VSF) functions. The nub of the idea is simple: (a)
use human subjective judgment to validate a mathematical function that approximates the choices
humans make when confronted with the pool of solutions to be considered; (b) use the mathematical
function (as the VSF) during automated search (for optimal solutions); (c) produce by automated
search a plurality of good solutions (according to the model); and (d) offer these good solutions
as members of a consideration set for subsequent deliberation. (Points (c) and (d) instantiate the
more general concept of solution pluralism (Kimbrough, Kuo, Lau, Murphy, & Wood, 2011).)
While we agree that the VSF idea ((a)–(d), sketched above) has much to recommend it, the
supporting evidence presented in Chou et al. (2012) was rather modest, as we shall see. The purpose
of this article is to report on an experiment that augments the unusual, even unique, data set produced
by Chou et al. (2012) and investigates the core idea more thoroughly. The second section, entitled
‘‘Essential Background,’’ succinctly presents necessary background. ‘‘Experiment 4,’’ the third sec-
tion, then presents the experiment and discusses the results. We conclude in the ‘‘Discussion’’ sec-
tion with some brief comments.
Essential Background
Our context is the design of electoral districts. In the United States, after each census it is usually
necessary to redraw the boundaries of electoral districts in order to maintain approximately equal
populations among them. The process is called districting, redistricting or reapportionment. It is
fraught—contentious and consequential—because there are often many legally valid ways to draw
the boundaries of the districts, but different designs will favor different interests. Attracting
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considerable public attention of late, for example Draper (2012) and Wang (2013a, 2013b), the uni-
versal worry is that when it comes to reapportionment those in power will normally attend to their
own interests ahead of the public’s. The question, ‘‘And will elected politicians use redistricting to
pick their voters, instead of the other way around?’’ (Altman & Klass, 2005), voices an often-
repeated worry that advances in information technology will serve to work against the public inter-
est. The literature is enormous; see, for example, Altman, MacDonald, and McDonald (2005), Cain
(1984), Cox and Katz (2002), and Turner and Lamacchia (1999).
Electoral districts that are oddly shaped for the purpose of benefitting some party, cause, or even
individual are said to be gerrymandered. There is widespread agreement that gerrymandering is not
in the public’s interest. Among other things, this has led to efforts to get the public involved by
encouraging the development of districting proposals by the general public in hopes that better plans
will lead to better outcomes (e.g., Satullo, 2011).
The antidote to interest-based designs is generally seen to be an objective basis for designing
electoral districts. But how? Gerrymandered districts are often apparent to the eye; they sprawl and
meander in seemingly arbitrary ways. They are not tight and tidy. To use the common term, they are
not compact. The hope has been to find an objective measure of compactness, which may then be
used to assess districting plans (Cox & Katz, 2002; Niemi, Grofman, Carlucci, & Hofeller, 1990;
Young, 1988; see also Fryer & Holden, 2011, pp. 497–498; Altman & McDonald, 2012; Niemi,
Grofman, Carlucci, & Hofeller, 1990, pp. 1156–1157; and Barabas & Jerit, 2004). Points arising:
1. If an objectively assessable measure of compactness could be agreed upon as the objective in
reapportionment, then it would be possible in principle to conduct search and optimization by
computer to find good designs. One would minimize the compactness measure (assume
smaller is better), subject to legal constraints on contiguity and population size (Cox & Katz,
2002; Kalcsics, Nickel, & Schro¨der, 2005; Young, 1988; see also Gopalan et al., 2013; Mur-
phy, Hess, & Wong-Martinez, 2012).
2. There is in fact no general agreement regarding measures of compactness for reapportion-
ment. Young (1988) argues in detail that all standard measures of compactness have serious
flaws, and hence there can be no mathematical or a priori basis for choosing among them. In
a follow-on study, Niemi et al. (1990) extend Young’s findings. They conclude that combin-
ing multiple measures of compactness should be explored as a possible solution. They do not
develop this idea, and, to our knowledge, it remains only as a suggestion. In short, Young’s
views have been widely accepted. As Fryer and Holden (2011, p. 494) note, ‘‘There is no
consensus on how to adequately measure compactness.’’
3. Even if agreement on the definition of compactness for reapportionment purposes could be
had, limiting the objective of the optimization to compactness is problematic, since other
objectives, such as protection of neighborhood integrity (Fryer & Holden, 2011; Satullo,
2011), are often important.
This last point is addressed in a principled way by point (d) in the VSF concept (above). The first
point offers a hope if Points 2 and 3 can be resolved favorably. So, we are left with addressing Point
2: the problem of finding a measure of compactness that can be used in automated search that is
sufficiently warranted to serve as a surrogate for human judgment.
Given Young’s (1988) analyses, the justification for a compactness measure will have to be an
empirical one, yet very little of such work is available. This takes us to the article by Chou et al.
(2012). Further points arising:
1. Besides proposing the VSF concept, Chou et al. (2012) succeeded in the technically challen-
ging task of producing 116 good solutions for a difficult districting problem (Point (c),
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above). Every design was required to allocate each of the 66 wards to 1 of 10 councilmanic
districts for the city of Philadelphia, using data from the 2010 census. In consequence, the
raw search space, assuming assignment of at least one ward to each of the 10 districts, is sized
as a Stirling number of the second kind, S (66, 10) ¼ 2.7 " 1059. They used evolutionary
computation to produce this pool of legal solutions by minimizing on a measure of compact-
ness, subject to feasibility on contiguity and population size.
2. The measure of compactness used by Chou et al. (2012) was the max–max distance. Their
optimization sought to minimize the maximum of the largest intradistrict distance within a
plan. This is very much a nonstandard measure of compactness, use of which was necessi-
tated by the information available at the time.
3. Further, Chou et al. (2012) undertook three experiments that gave qualified support from
human judgments for use of this compactness measure as a VSF in the context of electoral
districting. Using paired comparisons of district plans that were chosen to be well separated
in terms of the max–max distance measure, they were able to show, across 3 experiments, a
discernible level of agreement between comparative compactness judgments of the subjects
and the verdicts of the max–max distance metric.
We conjecture that a main reason why careful empirical studies have not heretofore been done on
measures of compactness for electoral districts is that there have not been libraries of alternative plans
available for comparison. In fact, reporting of the production of the 116 plans, and how this was
achieved, was, with the VSF idea, the main thrust of Chou et al. (2012). Given their quite limited and
provisional empirical results—Items (2) and (3) just above—it becomes important to test the VSF idea
on standard measures of compactness. That is just what our experiment was designed to do.
Experiment 4
Chou et al. (2012) report three experiments on human judgment of compactness, using maps (district
plans) drawn from the 116 produced by their evolutionary algorithm. Their experiment 2 is not
directly comparable to our experiment, and so we will not discuss it further. In their first and third
experiments, the same four pairs of district plans were presented to subjects who were asked to yield
judgments of comparative compactness. In terms of Table 1, subjects were asked to choose between
maps (1 and 2), (3 and 4), (5 and 6), and (7 and 8) with regard to compactness. Most importantly,
subjects were asked to choose on the basis of what they judged most other people would think with
regard to the comparative compactness. Further, subjects were rewarded based on the number of
choices they made that agreed with the majority. This is called a beauty contest design; it provides
incentive for the subjects to report honestly and thoughtfully. Experiment 1 was performed in a
laboratory setting; Experiment 3 was conducted on Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT). The results
of the two experiments were in good agreement.
Our Experiment 4 extended Experiment 3 on AMT. We used the same basic setup with these
modifications.
1. Subjects were asked to choose between 8 pairs of maps (numbered 1–16), instead of 4, as in
Experiment 3 (and Experiment 1). (All 16 maps were drawn without replacement.)
2. Maps 1–8 (and pairings) were as in Experiment 3 (and Experiment 1). Maps 9–16 were
paired in the same pattern, now (9 and 10), (11 and 12), (13 and 14), and (15 and 16).
3. Maps 9–16 were randomly drawn anew. Note especially that, unlike Maps 1–8, they were not
selected to be far apart in objective values.
4. Subjects were paid US$0.20 to complete the task, with a bonus of US$2.00 for 7 or 8 agree-
ments with the group, and US$1.00 for 5 or 6.
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5. Maps 1 and 2 were presented paired in random order, Maps 3 and 4 were presented paired in
random order, and so on.
6. We limited participation to 200 subjects, each of whom recorded judgments on the 8 pairs of
maps; 20 made 8 judgments that agreed with the majority vote in each case, 38 judged cor-
rectly in 7 of the 8 cases, 30 got 6 of the 8 right, and 22 got 5 of 8 right.
Table 1 presents the key data from the experiment, along with other information, including the
results of Experiments 1 and 3. Points arising:
1. The column labeled ‘‘Exp. 4’’ presents the votes received by individual maps in the pair
comparisons. The column labeled ‘‘Obj.’’ records the max–max distance score of the asso-
ciated map. Recall that lower scores are (presumably or hypothetically) associated with bet-
ter compactness, where the max–max distance consists of finding the largest distance
between the two points in a district and finding the maximum of those distances over all
districts. The votes are all in the ‘‘right’’ direction and consistent with the results of Experi-
ments 1 and 3. The p values are significant in each case: .0280 (Map 1–Map 2 pairing),
7.0085e-04 (Maps 3–4), 4.1640e-07 (Maps 5–6), and 2.4865e-05 (Maps 7–8).
2. The votes are not in the ‘‘right’’ direction for the max–max distance measure of compact-
ness for the pairings Maps 9–10, Maps 11–12, and Maps 15–16. The voting differences,
however, are significant with p values of .0097 (Maps 9–10), .0018 (Maps 11–12),
7.5353e-09 (Maps 13–14), and .0141 (Maps 15–16). Note that in these cases the objective
values of the compared maps are much closer together than in the earlier comparisons. This
suggests that max–max distance is not salient or ‘‘right’’ for subjects in judging compact-
ness when the compared values are too close together.
3. Using manual tracing, assisted by computer, we obtained the perimeters and areas of each
of the 10 districts in each of the 16 maps. The perimeter values are reported in Table 1 in the
column labeled ‘‘Perim.’’ Both the perimeter and the area values were used in computing
the Schwartzberg measure shown in the column labeled ‘‘Schwartzb.’’ Thus, we augmented
the data available in Chou et al. (2012).
Table 1. Summary of Results, Experiments 1, 3, and 4. (Perimeters given in miles)
Map Exp. 1 Exp. 3 Exp. 4 Total Obj. Schwartzb Dist2 Perim
1 19 83 114 216 341.62 1.678 138.840 220.03
2 0 54 86 140 399.34 1.845 176.328 240.28
3 17 73 123 213 346.75 1.761 144.472 231.35
4 3 64 77 144 399.34 1.840 179.943 239.65
5 4 58 65 127 399.34 1.847 179.119 240.50
6 15 79 135 229 346.57 1.666 136.005 218.68
7 13 86 129 228 346.57 1.677 137.253 219.89
8 7 51 71 129 391.26 1.709 153.287 224.81
9 117 117 377.46 1.645 134.742 216.33
10 83 83 365.49 1.706 136.250 224.71
11 79 79 369.43 1.831 170.476 238.10
12 121 121 378.46 1.669 136.141 219.48
13 140 140 367.58 1.757 146.284 230.66
14 60 60 399.34 1.894 191.830 246.67
15 84 84 355.37 1.787 165.173 230.90
16 116 116 377.46 1.705 136.641 223.90
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4. The Schwartzberg measure of compactness is the ratio of the perimeter of a district divided
by the perimeter of the circle having the same area as the district. Lower values indicate
more compact districts on this measure. In the table, in the column labeled ‘‘Schwartzb,’’
we report the sum of the Schwartzberg measures for each district in the corresponding map
divided by the number of districts (10 in the case of Philadelphia).
5. There is perfect agreement between the Schwartzberg measure and the majority voting
results in Experiments 1, 3, and 4.
6. There is perfect agreement between the perimeter measure and the majority voting in
Experiments 1, 3, and 4 (and with Schwartzberg).
7. The column labeled ‘‘Dist2’’ in Table 1 records the (square of the) total Euclidean distances
in each design/map between the centroids of the districts and the centers of their constituent
wards. This is a commonly used compactness metric (often called the center of gravity
measure), with smaller numbers indicating better values. (This information was available
at the time of writing of Chou et al., 2012 but was not used.)
8. There is perfect agreement between the Dist2 measure and the majority voting in Experi-
ments 1, 3, and 4 (and with Schwartzberg and perimeter). Of course, distance itself would
preserve the agreement as well. The (Pearson) correlation coefficient between the average
Schwartzberg measure and distance (square root of Dist2) is .9570, suggesting that while
these are indeed different measures, they will be largely equivalent for practical purposes.
9. On the basis of these results, we find support for the hypotheses that the Schwartzberg
measure, the perimeter measure, and the distance measure can be used as VSFs in district-
ing because they accord well with human subject judgment. Of course, we have no data to
rule out possible measures of compactness, other than max–max distance.
10. Interestingly, the favorite map of Chou et al. (2012), shown in Figure 2 of Chou et al., has a
Distance2 score of 132.2226, which is the lowest of the 116 maps we discovered. This is a
fact we encountered after Chou et al. selected the map as the best of the bunch.
11. Figure 1 shows gray scale versions of Maps 9 and 10, in which subjects were asked to com-
pare on compactness. Note that on the max–max distance criterion (in the ‘‘Obj.’’ column),
Map 10 has a lower score than Map 9 and hence is counted as more compact by this
Figure 1. Map 9 (left) and Map 10 (right).
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criterion. The voting, however, is 117 to 83 in favor of Map 9. As noted earlier, the average
Schwartzberg, the Dist2, and the Perim measures all agree with the voting in counting Map 9
as more compact than Map 10. We find this a remarkable performance by our Mechanical
Turk subjects. (The pattern repeats itself for the other pairs of maps, but space limitations pre-
vent their display here.)
Discussion
The problem of compactness—of defining it, of using it—is central to the problem of avoiding
malapportionment in electoral districting. Yet, as we have noted, it is beset with difficulties. In his
review of compactness measures for districting, Young (1988) concludes that ‘‘compactness is such
a hazy and ill-defined concept that it seems impossible to apply it, in any rigorous sense, to matters
of law.’’ This is widely accepted, with the following passage reflecting the received view.
Compactness refers to the shape of a district, but is formally ill-defined. Scholars have proposed over
fifty compactness measures, which have not resulted in clarity, since these measures conflict and can
be manipulated. (Altman & McDonald, 2012, p. 1190)
The approach we have sketched may well afford keeping the baby without the bath water.
Young’s analysis presumes that the standard measures of compactness are to be assessed in an abso-
lute fashion. If so, then we would agree that the contingencies of geography and policy will defeat
any attempt to mandate a threshold score for compactness on any known measure. But there is an
alternative. The perspective we would urge is to use them in a relative or comparative sense. We
should judge a districting plan as (relatively) compact based on some measure M if it scores well
compared to relevant alternative plans, the relevant plans being that plurality of known solutions
that are legally valid and have generally good scores for compactness (comparatively). If one or
a pool of compactness measures can be empirically validated, then surely the move we have indi-
cated of focusing discussion on the better scoring solutions could be used at the least to shift the
burden of argument onto those who would advocate significant departures. Very many extant dis-
tricting plans are in fact in this category. See the maps in Figure 1 for representative examples,
as well as the maps in our project repository (http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/~sok/phillydistricts/).
Questions that naturally arise in consequence include (1) how do disinterested human subjects
judge compactness of electoral districts and to what extent do these judgments agree with estab-
lished measures of compactness? And (2) how might pooled judgments regarding compactness
be used to improve the reapportionment process? Regarding Question (1), as the following passage
attests, the advisability of undertaking empirical assessment of districting plans and methods is
becoming recognized.
The development of a new generation of software, such as our DistrictBuilder system [http://www.dis-
trictbuilder.org/, last visited 2013-03-03], has enabled members of the public to create hundreds of real
districting plans—plans based on official census data, and satisfying all of the criteria required by law.
The existence of this large corpus of redistricting plans for the first time is beginning to enable an empiri-
cal analysis of redistricting plans that both expands our understanding of the range of redistricting
outcomes that are feasible in practice, and illuminates the trade-offs that members of the public tend
to view as most desirable. (Altman & McDonald, 2012, p. 1197)
The experiment we report here is among the first, if it is not the first, to compare human judg-
ments of compactness for real districting plans with standard measures of compactness for those
540 Social Science Computer Review 32(4)
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plans. Of course, many more experiments are called for. What we have here, however, are encoura-
ging results and a replicable method.
Regarding Question (2), even if an acceptable measure of compactness (or pool of such measures)
could be agreed to, there remain severe problems of application.
The ideal data to estimate [compactness] would contain the geographical coordinates of every household
in the United States, its political district, some measure of distance between any two households within a
state, and a precise definition of communities of interest. This information is not available. (Fryer &
Holden, 2011, p. 506)
The passage is correct as far as it goes, but it greatly understates the difficulties. At the least, addi-
tional criteria, such as respect for existing political boundaries and geographic features, will often be
important. And arriving at ‘‘a precise definition of communities of interest’’ is an enormous under-
taking. The upshot is that for the foreseeable future we shall be under the condition described at the
outset of having only models that are very inaccurate representations of the underlying problem.
The VSF idea, supported by the empirical findings reported here, affords the third option iden-
tified above: Using an admittedly flawed model to support discussion and deliberation, implement-
ing a modification of an optimal solution to the model in response to considerations not fully
represented in the model. In a nutshell, the idea is to use the ability to generate a large number of
good solutions to constrain the decision process to a suitably characterized pool, each member of
which is reasonably compact and meets the legal requirements on contiguity and population size.
One might set a loose requirement on compactness, perhaps as measured by several different rules.
Evolutionary computation, or indeed any other workable method, could be used to generate a large
consideration set of objectively good quality solutions. Let anyone contribute to this pool but limit
the consideration set to the pool. This leaves room for a modicum of politics and for incorporation of
other features not incorporated into the computational models, and it secures choice among
objectively good solutions. A regime on this order (further details are needed, of course) could in
fact be implemented by agreement of nonpartisan districting boards, where they exist. Other zone
design applications—such as design of sales districts—might follow a similar procedure as well.
In this regard, we note that redistricting problems are normally multiobjective—
Drawing political maps necessarily involves making difficult choices among a number of competing
political values. Among these are population equality, representation of minority groups, geographic
compactness and contiguity, respect for the boundaries of other political units at different spatial scales,
continuity with previous district boundary, and (of course) partisan advantage . . . (Eagles, Katz, &
Mark, 1999)
—as are zone design problems generally (Sacks, 2000). Yet, often there is (as in the Philadelphia
districting case) a practical impossibility of representing all important aspects of the problem in a
single optimization model, if only for lack of data. By producing a plurality of good solutions to
a reasonable optimization model, we can hope to provide stakeholders with useful grist for the mill
of deliberation.
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